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Summary. Transaction costs on ﬁnancial markets may have important conse-
quences for volumes of trade, asset pricing, and welfare. This paper introduces
an algorithm for the computation of equilibria in the general equilibrium model
with incomplete asset markets and transaction costs. We show that economies
with transaction costs can be analyzed with differentiable homotopy techniques
and thus in the same framework as frictionless economies despite the existence
of non-differentiabilities of agents’ asset demand functions and the existence of
locally non-unique equilibria. We introduce an equilibrium selection concept into
the computation of economic equilibria that picks out a speciﬁc equilibrium in the
presence of a continuum of equilibria.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to extend the work of Brown et al. (1996a,b), De-
Marzo and Eaves (1996), and Schmedders (1998, 1999) on the computation of
GEI equilibria to a setting with transaction costs. We lay the theoretical founda-
tion for a computational analysis of the impact of linear transaction costs in GEI
economies. We present a homotopy algorithm for the computation of equilibria in
ﬁnance economies with such transaction costs. Finding equilibria in models with
transaction costs is frequently thought of as a combinatorial problem (see Dufﬁe
andJackson,1989),whichleadstotheconclusionthatthesearchforanequilibrium
is quite cumbersome. We show that instead we can phrase the problem as ﬁnding
a solution to a single small system of equations.
The theoretical development of our algorithm reveals difﬁculties that are of
economic importance. In the presence of linear transaction costs, excess demand
functions are typically not differentiable and equilibria do not need to be locally
unique. In particular, some markets get closed endogenously and equilibria with
closedmarketsexhibitacontinuumofassetpricesintheclosedmarket.Thisfunda-
mental difference between models with and without transaction costs implies that
computing equilibria in transaction costs models is not a simple extension of the
known methods for models without such a friction. The way we take care of these
problems are of general interest and not restricted to the computation of equilibria
in GEI economies with linear transaction costs. In particular we show how to em-
bed the model with transaction costs into the same differentiable framework that
is popular for standard GEI ﬁnance economies. Crucial to the development of our
arguments is the introduction of an equilibrium selection concept that allows us to
pick out particular equilibria if there is indeed a continuum of equilibrium asset
prices. Moreover, this concept allows us to characterize the entire continuum of
equilibria.
Transaction costs are still important features of ﬁnancial markets and are likely
to have a big impact on volumes of trade, asset pricing and agents’ welfare. In
additiontothewell-knownreasonsformarketincompletenesssuchasinformational
asymmetries and moral hazard problems, transaction costs are sometimes given
as another explanation of market incompleteness, see, for example, Geanakoplos
(1990).This potential consequence of transaction costs is just one striking example
oftheirimpactonthevolumeoftradeforﬁnancialassets.Althoughcommissionfees
have decreased substantially over the past decade, other forms of transaction costs
like the ones caused by bid-asks spreads remain substantial. For the importance
of bid-ask spreads, as well as for some numerical assessments of transaction costs
caused by them, see Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) and Jouini and Kallal (1995).
The transaction costs in our model could also be interpreted as a form of securities
transactiontax.SummersandSummers(1989)proposesuchatax(seealsoStiglitz,
1989) to reduce excessive speculation by “throwing sand in the gears” of ﬁnancial
markets, similar to Tobin’s proposal to impose a tiny tax on currency trades.Again
the intuition is that increasing transaction costs should lead to decreasing volumes
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the model of a ﬁnance economy with transaction costs and characterize the set of
no-arbitrage prices. Section 3 introduces the homotopy and outlines the main ideas
of our homotopy approach. We introduce the equilibrium selection concept and
show how to deﬁne an appropriate homotopy. Section 4 reports numerical results.
2 A ﬁnance economy with transaction costs
We consider the standard model of a ﬁnance economy with the additional feature
of transaction costs on the ﬁnancial markets. There are two dates, t =0 ,1, with
uncertainty at t =0about the state of nature that realizes at t =1 . We identify
date0withstateofnature0.Atdate1,exactlyoneoutofS possiblestatesofnature
realizes.
There are H agents in the economy. An agent h is characterized by his initial
income stream eh ∈ R1+S and his preferences. The future initial income stream,
which is uncertain, is denoted by eh
1 1 ∈ RS.Agent h has a preference over income
spent for consumption in the various states, ch ∈ R
1+S
+ . Preferences of agent h are
represented by a utility function uh : R
1+S
+ → R.
Agents have the possibility to use J assets in order to modify their income
stream across time and across states. Asset j pays a dividend dj
s in state of nature




S)  and the matrix of asset payoffs
is A =( d1,...,d J).Without loss of generality, assets are in zero net supply.With
a slight abuse of notation we also use H, J and S to denote the set of agents, the
set of assets and the set of future states of nature, respectively.
Prices q =( q1,...,q J)  of assets are denoted in units of income. Sales of
assets by agent h are denoted by θh,− ∈ RJ
+ and purchases by θh,+ ∈ RJ
+. The net
trade in assets then leads to an asset portfolio θh = θh,+ − θh,−. Both buyers and
sellers of assets incur real transaction costs.
















j are nonnegative transaction costs, denoted








j for all agents h and h , and denote these costs by kj. This
approach to modeling transaction costs is identical to the one in Arrow and Hahn
(1999).A ﬁnance economy with incomplete markets and transaction costs is given
by E = {(eh,u h)h∈H,A,k}.
Throughout the paper we make the following assumptions.
A1 For all h ∈ H, the initial income stream eh belongs to R
1+S
++ . We deﬁne the
open set E = R
(1+S)H
++ .
A2 For all h ∈ H,the utility function uh is three times continuously differentiable
on R
1+S
++ ,∂u h   0,∂ 2uh is negative deﬁnite, and interior income streams are
preferred to income streams with zero components, uh(ch) >u h(ch), when
ch ∈ R
1+S





A3 The rank of the matrix of asset payoffs A is J.
A4 For all j ∈ J, transaction costs are positive, kj > 0.496 P.J.J. Herings and K. Schmedders
AssumptionsA1 andA2 are standard in the literature, when differentiability of
demand functions is needed for the analysis. The assumption that interior income
streams are preferred is standard as well, but can easily be dispensed with when
using the techniques developed in this paper. The assumption that the matrix of
asset payoffs has full rank, A3, is not without loss of generality in the case with
transaction costs. We need this assumption to avoid degeneracies in the agents’
optimization problems.
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We restrict ourselves in this paper to transaction costs on the units of assets
traded.Ofcourse,wecouldinsteadconsidertransactioncostsonthevalueofassets
traded.Ouralgorithmcaneasilybeextendedtomodelswithsuchtransactioncosts.
Note also that we consider transaction costs in a broad sense, so they incorporate
effort, fees, taxes, or bid-ask spreads.
2.1 No-arbitrage asset prices
Some asset prices q ∈ RJ may lead to arbitrage in which case an agent’s decision
problem does not have a solution. This fact creates the need to characterize the
set of no-arbitrage prices. Because of the presence of transaction costs, the set of
no-arbitrage prices gets larger than in the model of a ﬁnance economy without
transaction costs.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A vector q ∈ RJ is a no-arbitrage asset price system when there
does not exist an asset portfolio (θ−,θ+) ∈ RJ
+ × RJ
+ such that (q − k) · θ− −
(q + k) · θ+ > 0 and A(θ+ − θ−) ≥ 0, or (q − k) · θ− − (q + k) · θ+ ≥ 0 and
A(θ+ − θ−) > 0.1
A vector q admits arbitrage possibilities whenever it is possible to make strictly
positive proﬁts in at least one state and nonnegative proﬁts in all states. We have
the following characterization of no-arbitrage prices.
Proposition 2.2. A vector q ∈ RJ is a no-arbitrage asset price system if and only
if there is π ∈ RS
++ such that π A − k ≤ q ≤ π A + k.
1 For a vector x ∈ Rn we deﬁne x>0 as xi ≥ 0 for all i and xj > 0 for at least some j.Computing equilibria in ﬁnance economies with incomplete markets and transaction costs 497














where I is a (J × J)-identity matrix and 0 a (J × J)-zero matrix. By deﬁnition, a
vector q ∈ RJ is a no-arbitrage price system if and only if for each s =0 ,...,S,
there is no solution θs =( θs,−,θs,+) ∈ RJ × RJ to Mθs ≥ 0 and (Mθs)s > 0.
By the variant of Farkas’lemma given in Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 22.2, page




s > 0 and λs
 




+ suchthatλ M =0 .Nowthetheoremfollowsimmediately
after some elementary algebra.    
Proposition 2.2 reduces to the fundamental theorem on the pricing of ﬁnan-
cial securities for k =0 . The set of no-arbitrage prices is denoted by Q, and it is
straightforward to show that Q is an open set if A has full column rank. Proposi-
tion 2.2 implies that Q is no longer a cone with vertex zero. The next proposition
easily follows from our assumptions.
Proposition 2.3. When q ∈ Q, the budget set Bh(q) is compact and convex, and
the agent’s decision problem has a solution (θh,−,θh,+,c h) that is unique and that
satisﬁes θh,− · θh,+ =0 .
2.2 Agents’demand and competitive equilibrium
Proposition 2.3 implies that a single agent is never active simultaneously on the
demand side and the supply side of an asset market. There is no ambiguity when
we do not consider supply and demand of assets separately, but instead use the
net asset portfolio purchased, θh = θh,+ − θh,−. Proposition 2.3 implies that
the (net) demand of agent h for assets at prices q ∈ Q is a function gh : Q →
RJ. The demand of all agents for all assets is given by the HJ-vector g(q)=
(g1(q),...,gH(q)).Total asset demand is a function G : Q → RJ, where G(q)=  H
h=1 gh(q).
Deﬁnition 2.4. A competitive equilibrium for an economy E is a collection of
portfolio holdings θ∗ =( θ∗1,...,θ∗H) ∈ RHJ and asset prices q∗ ∈ RJ such
that
1. θ∗h is a utility maximizing asset portfolio for agent h at prices q∗,
2.
 
h∈H θ∗h =0 .
The price vector q∗ is a competitive equilibrium price system if and only if
G(q∗)=0 . Equilibrium asset portfolios and equilibrium incomes spent on con-
sumption in each state are completely determined by equilibrium prices, since, due
to the monotonicity of the utility function, the solution to an agent’s optimization




demand function G are continuous on the set Q and satisfy a properness condition.
We refer to Herings and Schmedders (2001) for a detailed proof.
3 Computation of equilibria
A large part of the literature on GEI ﬁnance economies in the past (for a recent
survey, see Hens and Pilgrim, 2002) focusses on differentiable economies. Differ-
entiability assumptions have been widely made in general equilibrium ever since
Debreu(1972)(seealsoMas-Colell,1985).OnereasonwhyGEImodelswithtrans-
action costs have been rarely examined in much detail is that transaction costs are
commonly believed to be incompatible with the usual differentiability assumption.
The main purpose of this paper is to show that the computation of equilibria for
modelswithtransactioncostscanbeembeddedinthestandarddifferentiableframe-
work, even though there may be locally non-unique equilibria. We can compute
equilibria for our model in the tradition of Brown et al. (1996), Schmedders (1998,
1999), and Herings and Kubler (2002). Crucial in our approach is the introduction
of an equilibrium selection concept that allows us to pick out particular equilibria
if there is indeed a continuum. Moreover, this concept allows us to characterize the
entire continuum of equilibria. The homotopy approach allows us to nicely relate
a constructive existence proof to the computation of equilibria. Moreover, Kubler
andSchmedders(2000)showthatotheralgorithmssuchasNewton-basedmethods
doverypoorlycomputingGEIequilibria,andbecauseofdifferentiabilityproblems
one would expect such methods to do even worse in models with transaction costs.
3.1 The common homotopy approach
A natural homotopy for computing equilibria in our model would be the function
F :[ 0 ,1] × Q → RJ which is deﬁned by
F(t,q)=tG(q)+( 1− t)(q0 − q), (t,q) ∈ [0,1] × Q,
where q0 may be any price system in Q. Note that for t =0 , there is a unique
solution,q = q0.Fort =1 ,theproblemF(1,q)=0isequaltotheproblemG(q)=
0, and therefore solving F(1,q)=0amounts to ﬁnding an equilibrium asset price
vector q. The idea now would be to start at the unique solution for F(0,q)=0
and to follow a path of solutions to F(t,q)=0until eventually a solution to
F(1,q)=0is reached. In order to formalize this idea we would like to show
that F is a twice continuously differentiable function, that F−1({0}) is a compact
1-dimensional differentiable manifold with boundary, and that the boundary of
F−1({0}) equals the transversal intersection of F−1({0}) and the boundary of
[0,1] × Q. Usually it is impossible to prove the transversality conditions for all
economies. The standard approach is then to invoke methods from transversalityComputing equilibria in ﬁnance economies with incomplete markets and transaction costs 499
theory such as Sard’s theorem to show that transversality conditions hold for a
generic set of economies.




the domain of F into subsets where the excess demand G and thus the homotopy
F are differentiable. The zero sets of F on the different subsets are then nicely tied
together to guarantee the convergence of the algorithm. The second difﬁculty is
that even the application of transversality theory cannot rule out the occurrence of
robust degeneracies which occur at t =1 .With transaction costs it cannot be ruled
out that certain assets are robustly non-traded by every trader, even at equilibrium
prices.Inthatcasethereisacontinuumofequilibriumprices,assmallperturbations
inpricesofassetsthatnobodytradesindonotaffectmarketclearing.Thesolutions
to the homotopy equations cannot even be expected to constitute a 1-dimensional
topological manifold. For example, if two or more assets are robustly non-traded,
then the prices of all these assets can vary within some neighborhood without
affecting the equilibria.
3.2 Equilibrium selection
We solve the robust degeneracy problem by making an equilibrium selection. We
analyze two alternatives for equilibrium selection. The ﬁrst alternative considers
only those competitive equilibria where for each asset market there is either non-
zero trade, or there is zero trade and at least one agent is indifferent between selling
anassetandnotsellinganasset.Thesecondalternativeconsidersthosecompetitive
equilibria where for each asset market there is non-zero trade, or at least one agent
is indifferent between buying and not buying an asset.
We say that an agent h is indifferent at q between selling asset j and being
inactive in asset market j if gh
j (q)=0and the relaxation of the non-negativity
constraint on θ
h,−
j would not affect the optimal decision of household h. Under
our differentiability assumptions on utilities the latter condition is equivalent to the
requirement that the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the inequality θ
h,−
j ≥
0 equals zero at q. This Lagrange multiplier is denoted by λ
h,−






s.A similar deﬁnition applies for
an agent to be indifferent between buying asset j and being inactive in asset market
j. The Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the inequality θ
h,+
j ≥ 0 is denoted by
λ
h,+
j (q) and equals ∂ch

















that robust non-degeneracies may occur.500 P.J.J. Herings and K. Schmedders
Deﬁnition 3.1. A competitive equilibrium (θ∗,q∗) of E is demand-perfect,i fi n
each asset market j there is non-zero trade, θ∗h
j  =0for some h, or at least one
agent is indifferent between selling asset j and not selling asset j, I
−
j (q∗)  = ∅.
The terminology demand-perfect comes from the fact that generically demand-
perfect equilibria are the ones that are robust to the introduction of a trader that
demands all assets. Indeed, generically, demand-perfect equilibria are obtained by
perturbing the total excess demand function of the economy by an excess demand
function of a trader that demands all assets, considering the set of competitive
equilibria that results, and taking the limit of the set of competitive equilibria for a
perturbationgoingtozero.Foreachassetmarket,itholdsinthelimiteitherthatthere
is non-zero trade or that one agent will be on the limit of supplying the asset or not
supplyingtheasset.Asimilarmotivationcanbegivenforsupply-perfectequilibria.
From an economic point of view, no information is lost by restricting attention
to supply-perfect or demand-perfect equilibria, in the sense that no competitive
equilibrium allocations are lost.
Proposition 3.2. For each competitive equilibrium (θ∗,q∗) of E there is exactly
one allocationally equivalent supply-perfect equilibrium (θ∗,qs) and exactly one
allocationally equivalent demand-perfect equilibrium (θ∗,qd).
Proof. Let (θ∗,q∗) be a competitive equilibrium of E, inducing income streams
used for consumption c∗. If for all j ∈ J there exists h ∈ H such that θ∗h
j  =0 ,
then (θ∗,q∗) is both a supply-perfect and a demand-perfect equilibrium and the
proposition holds.
Suppose asset market j ∈ J is such that θ∗h
j =0for all h ∈ H. We
give the argument for the existence of a demand-perfect equilibrium that is al-
locationally equivalent to the competitive equilibrium; the argument for the ex-
istence of an allocationally equivalent supply-perfect equilibrium is similar. If
minh∈H λ
h,−
j (q∗)=0 , then we deﬁne qd
j = q∗









s > 0. Since λ
h,−
j (q) is a












Ifassetmarketj ∈ J issuchthatθ∗h
j  =0forsomeh ∈ H,thenwedeﬁneqd
j = q∗
j.
Using the ﬁrst-order conditions for the decision problem of household h, it is
easilyveriﬁedthatθ∗h isanoptimalassetportfolioatpricesqd.Forallassetmarkets
j for which θ∗h
j =0for all h ∈ H,it holds that I
−
j (qd)  = ∅. It follows that (θ∗,qd)
is a demand-perfect equilibrium.    
The proof of Proposition 3.2 yields another important aspect of supply-perfect
and demand-perfect equilibria. These equilibria give a lower bound, respectively
an upper bound, on prices that sustain a certain allocation.We exploit this property
in our numerical example, to give the equilibrium interval of asset prices in case
there is no trade in a certain asset.Computing equilibria in ﬁnance economies with incomplete markets and transaction costs 501
We modify the excess demand function for the computation of demand-perfect








j (q),j =1 ,...,J.
We now add the term (ϕ(Λ
−
j (q)))/(1 + eqj) to the total excess demand function
Gj, where ϕ : R → R is any bounded, differentiable function with ϕ( 0 )=0and
ϕ  > 0.Anyfunctionofqj withaneverywherenonnegativederivativethatdiverges
to plus inﬁnity as qj tends to plus inﬁnity would sufﬁce.This addition results in the





1+eqj ,j ∈ J, q ∈ Q.
Proposition 3.3. It holds that (g1(qd),...,gH(qd),qd) is a demand-perfect com-
petitive equilibrium of E if and only if   G(qd)=0 .
Proof. Consider a demand-perfect equilibrium induced by prices qd. It holds that
G(qd)=0and,foreveryassetj,eitherthereisahouseholdh suchthatgh
 
j (qd)  =0 ,
or for all h, gh
j (qd)=0and there is a household h  such that λ
h
 ,−
j (qd)=0 . In
the ﬁrst case it follows by the deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium that without
loss of generality gh
 
j (qd) < 0 and therefore λ
h
 ,−
j (qd)=0 . In both cases it is then
immediate that   G(qd)=0 .
Consider a price system qd such that   G(qd)=0 . For every asset j, either
gh
 
j (qd)  =0for some agent h , or gh
j (qd)=0for all agents h =1 ,...,H.Since
Λ
−
j (qd) ≥ 0,ϕ ( 0 )=0and ϕ  > 0, it holds that ϕ(Λ
−
j (qd)) ≥ 0. It follows
that gh
 






j (qd)=0 . Then it is immediate that Gj(qd)=0 . In the latter case it holds that
Gj(qd)=0 , so Λ
−
j (qd)=0 , which implies that λ
h
 ,−
j (qd)=0for some agent
h . Combining the two cases implies that qd induces a demand-perfect equilibrium.
   
3.3 Bid-ask structures
Now we address the issue of non-differentiabilities of   G. The basic idea is to
subdivide the domain of   G into subsets on which   G is differentiable, and to jump
from one such subset to the next when tracking the solution curve of the homotopy.
Thisapproachissupportedbythefactthatgenericallythesesubsetsareacoveringof
Q, that is, the relative interiors of any two such subsets have an empty intersection,
andtheunionofallthosesubsetsequalsthesetQ.Thestandardhomotopyapproach
allowsustofollowapathofsolutionsinanyofthesesubsets.Oncewehitaboundary
of our domain subset we switch over to the next subset and continue the path. In
order to formalize this idea we need some further notation.502 P.J.J. Herings and K. Schmedders
We deﬁne a set R of sign vectors,
R = {r ∈ RHJ | rh
j ∈{ − 1,0,+1}}.
A sign vector r ∈ R determines a subset of Q where the sign of the trades being
made, the bid-ask structure, is determined by r. If rh
j = −1, then agent h supplies
asset j, if rh
j =0then agent h does not trade in asset market j, and if rh
j =+ 1 ,
then agent h is buying asset j.
Formally, for r ∈ R,
Q(r)={q ∈ Q | gh
j (q) < 0, or gh
j (q)=0 and h ∈ I
−
j (q), when rh
j = −1,
gh
j (q)=0 , when rh
j =0 ,
gh
j (q) > 0, or gh
j (q)=0 and h ∈ I
+
j (q), when rh
j =+ 1 },
and gh,r : Q(r) → RJ and Gr : Q(r) → RJ denote the restrictions of the
individual demand functions for assets and the total demand function for assets
to Q(r). For all q ∈ Q(r) an agent h is always taking a long position, a short
position, and not trading at all in the same set of assets. The fact that the long or
short position could go to zero complicates the deﬁnition somewhat. We deﬁne
Λ−r : Q(r) → RJ as the restriction of Λ− to Q(r). Notice that Λ
−r
j is identically
equal to zero if rh
j = −1 for at least one household h.
Proposition 3.4. For r ∈ R, the asset demand functions gh,r and Gr, and the
function Λ−r are twice continuously differentiable.2
The proof of Proposition 3.4 is given in Herings and Schmedders (2001). The
main step of the proof consists of applying the implicit function theorem to the sys-
temofnecessaryandsufﬁcientﬁrst-orderconditionsthatcharacterizegh,r onQ(r).
3.4 Homotopy
We can now deﬁne our homotopy function   F :[ 0 ,1] × Q → RJ by
  F(t,q)=t  G(q)+( 1− t)(q0 − q), (t,q) ∈ [0,1] × Q,
where q0 may be any price system in Q. Note that for t =0 , there is a unique
solution, q = q0. For t =1 , the problem   F(1,q)=0is equal to the problem
  G(q)=0 , and therefore, by Proposition 3.3, solving   F(1,q)=0amounts to
ﬁnding an asset price vector q that induces a demand-perfect equilibrium. The
function   F is differentiable on all subsets [0,1] × Q(r).
Next we deﬁne the set P(r) consisting of the pairs of the homotopy parameter
and the asset price vectors that satisfy the homotopy equation, together with the
requirement that r be compatible with the bid-ask structure in all markets, that is,
P(r)={(t,q) ∈ [0,1] × Q(r)|  F(t,q)=0 }.
2 A function with domain a subset of Euclidean space which is not necessarily open is differentiable
if it has a differentiable extension to an open neighborhood of its domain of deﬁnition.Computing equilibria in ﬁnance economies with incomplete markets and transaction costs 503
It is a well-known problem that it is usually impossible to ﬁnd an analytical
solution for the function G, and as a consequence for   F.We are not aware of any
utilityfunctionsatisfyingthestandardmonotonicityandconcavityassumptionsfor
which analytical solutions are available in the presence of both transaction costs
and incomplete markets. The homotopy approach makes it possible to tackle this
problem in an elegant way. Instead of characterizing the set P(r) by means of the
total demand function for assets G we will make use of the ﬁrst-order equations
that characterize demand. In the literature this is called an extended system, see
also Citanna (2000).
Givenasignvectorr ∈ R weareinterestedinthecollectionofassetsforwhich
agent h is a supplier, the assets in which he does not trade, and the assets for which








h (r)={j ∈ J | rh
j = −1},J 0




h (r)={j ∈ J | rh
j =+ 1 }.
The following notation indicates for each sign vector r ∈ R all combinations
of agents and assets where supply, inactivity or demand occurs,
R−(r)={(h,j) ∈ H × J | rh
j = −1},R 0(r)={(h,j) ∈ H × J | rh
j =0 },
R+(r)={(h,j) ∈ H × J | rh
j =+ 1 }.
Consider any sign vector r ∈ R and any (t,q) ∈ R × Q, then (t,q) ∈ P(r) if and
only if there is (λ−,λ +,θ,c) ∈ RK, where K =3 HJ + H(1 + S), such that
λ
h,−
j =0 , (h,j) ∈ R−(r), (1)
λ
h,+
j =0 , (h,j) ∈ R+(r), (2)
θh

























































1+eqj =0 ,j ∈ J, (8)
λ
h,−
j ≥ 0, (h,j) ∈ R0(r), (9)
λ
h,+
j ≥ 0, (h,j) ∈ R0(r), (10)
−θh
j ≥ 0, (h,j) ∈ R−(r), (11)504 P.J.J. Herings and K. Schmedders
θh
j ≥ 0, (h,j) ∈ R+(r), (12)
t ≥ 0, (13)
1 − t ≥ 0. (14)
Equations (8) are the perturbed market-clearing conditions that correspond to the
homotopyequations   F(t,q)=0 ,onlythattheasset-demandfunctionsarereplaced
bytheportfoliochoicesθh
j .Notethatequations(8)aretheonlyequationscontaining
the homotopy parameter t that is constrained to lie between 0 and 1 by inequalities
(13)–(14).Equations(1)–(7)andinequalities(9)–(12)aretheﬁrst-orderconditions
of the agents’ utility maximization problems. These conditions are necessary and
sufﬁcient since the agents’utility maximization problems are convex programming
problems with linear constraints, so a constraint qualiﬁcation is satisﬁed. In fact,




j ≥ 0 for (h,j) ∈ R+(r) and λ
h,+
j ≥ 0 for (h,j) ∈ R−(r).
These inequalities are redundant, as they follow with strict inequality from equa-
tions(1),(6)and(7),and(2),(6)and(7),respectively,makinguseoftheassumption
that ∂ch
0uh(ch) and kj are strictly positive. These inequalities are therefore omit-
ted. Equations (4) and (5) are the budget constraints, equations (6) and (7) are the
derivatives with respect to the decision variables θh
j , and equations (1)–(3) are the
complementary slackness conditions for the multipliers corresponding to the sign
constraints on the decision variables. Note that for (h,j) ∈ R0(r) the complemen-
tarity condition reduces simply to θh
j =0 , that is, to equation (3). If θh




(9)–(12) are the sign restriction on the decision variables and multipliers.
For r ∈ R, the solutions to the system of equations (1)–(8) and the inequalities
(9)–(14) are denoted by   P(r).
Proposition 3.5. For r ∈ R, P(r) and   P(r) are C2 diffeomorphic.




















1 1 = eh
1 1 +Agh(q). Then (t,q) ∈ P(r) if and only if f(t,q) ∈   P(r). That the
function f is C2 follows easily, see Herings and Schmedders (2001). Obviously,
f−1 is C∞.    
Deﬁne the open set E = R
(1+S)H
++ .
Theorem 3.6. There is a subset E∗ of E such that E \ E∗ has a closure with
Lebesgue measure zero and for all e ∈ E∗, for all r ∈ R,   P(r) is a compact, 1-
dimensionalC2 manifoldwithboundary.Apoint(t,q,λ−,λ +,θ,c)intheboundary
of   P(r) is either not a boundary point of   P(r) for all r  = r and belongs to
{0,1}×Q × RK, or is a boundary point of exactly one   P(r) with r  = r and
belongs to (0,1)×Q×RK. Moreover, r and r differ in exactly one element which
changes from −1 to 0 or from +1 to 0, or the reverse.Computing equilibria in ﬁnance economies with incomplete markets and transaction costs 505
Foralmostalleconomies,forallr ∈ R,theset   P(r)isacompact,1-dimensional
differentiablemanifoldwithboundary,soitisaﬁnitecollectionofdisjointpathsand
loops. It follows that each component of   P(r), i.e. a maximally connected subset
of   P(r), is either a path or a loop. We write   P(r)=  P(r,1) ∪···∪   P(r,c(r)),
where   P(r,c),c=1 ,...,c(r), is a component of   P(r) and c(r) is the number of
components in   P(r). The set   P = ∪r∈R   P(r) is C2 diffeomorphic to the set of all
solutions to the homotopy equations, so   P is C2 diffeomorphic to   F−1({0}).
The proof ofTheorem 3.6 is given in Herings and Schmedders (2001) and con-
sists of three parts. First, consider the system of equations (1)–(8). The number of
variables (t,q,λ−,λ +,θ,c) in the system of equations (1)–(8) equals 1+J + K,
one more than the number of equations which is given by J + K. Using transver-
sality theory, it is therefore indeed possible to show that there is generically a
one-dimensional set of solutions. Second, if in addition to (1)–(8), we require ex-
actly one of the inequalities in (9)–(14) to hold with equality, using transversality
theory, one can show that generically one obtains a ﬁnite set of locally unique so-
lutions. Third, it can be shown, generically, that a system of equations consisting
of (1)–(8) and two or more equations of (9)–(14) has no solutions. Although in
principle standard, the proof is very tedious because of the large number of cases
that have to be veriﬁed in the transversality arguments.
The following result conﬁrms that the non-differentiabilities of   F are well-
behavedanddoleadtowell-behavednon-differentiabilitiesof   F−1({0})thatallow
us to prove convergence of our algorithm.
Theorem 3.7. There is a subset E∗ of E such that E \ E∗ has a closure with
Lebesgue measure zero and such that for all e ∈ E∗ the following statements
hold. The set   F−1({0}) is a compact 1-dimensional piecewise C2 manifold with
boundary.3 The boundary of   F−1({0}) equals the intersection of F−1({0}) and
{0,1}×Q and is a compact 0-dimensional manifold. There is a unique boundary
pointin{0}×Qthatisconnectedby   F−1({0})toauniquelydeterminedboundary
point in {1}×Q, i.e. the homotopy path is well-deﬁned.
Proof. Consider the set E∗ of Theorem 3.6. For all e ∈ E∗, for all r ∈ R, the
set   P(r) consists of a ﬁnite number of paths and loops. Each path in   P(r) has two
boundary points. If it has a boundary point in {0,1}×Q×RK, then the boundary
point does not belong to any   P(r) for r  = r. It is then a boundary point of   P.If a
path has a boundary point in (0,1) × Q, then it is a boundary point of exactly one
  P(r) with r  = r. So it is a boundary point of a path in   P(r). This path has another
boundary point, either in {0,1}×Q × RK or in (0,1) × Q × RK. In the former
case, we have found a boundary point of   P.In the latter case, there is exactly one
  r such that the boundary point is also a boundary point of an arc in   P(  r), etc.
SincethecardinalityofthesetRisﬁnite,andeach   P(r)consistsofﬁnitelymany
paths and loops, it will either be the case that eventually a path is generated with a
boundary point in {0,1}×Q×RK, or a path is generated that has been generated
before.Inthelattercase,wehavefoundapiecewiseC2loopof   P.Intheformercase,
3 A manifold is a 1-dimensional piecewise C2 manifold if it is a 1-dimensional topological manifold
that is a ﬁnite union of C2 manifolds.506 P.J.J. Herings and K. Schmedders
the ﬁnite chain of paths constitutes a piecewise C2 path of   P with boundary points
belonging to {0,1}×Q. It follows that   P is a compact 1-dimensional piecewise
C2 manifold with boundary, where the boundary is given by the intersection of   P
and {0,1}×Q × RK. As a consequence it follows that   F−1({0}) is a compact
1-dimensional piecewise C2 manifold with boundary, where the boundary is given
by the intersection of   F−1({0}) and {0,1}×Q. Notice that the argument above
is nothing but a nonlinear version of the door-in door-out principle of Lemke and
Howson (1964).
Itiseasytoseethatthereisauniqueboundarypointin{0}×Q,since   F(0,q)=
q0−q,which has q = q0 as the unique solution in   F−1({0}). Since   F−1({0}) is a
1-dimensionalmanifoldwithboundary,theuniquesolutionin{0}×Qisconnected
by   F−1({0}) to a uniquely determined boundary point in {1}×Q.    
The homotopy approach now consists of numerically following the homotopy
pathin   F−1({0})thatconnectstheuniqueboundarypointin{0}×Qtoauniquely
determined boundary point in {1}×Q. The latter point induces a demand-perfect
equilibrium.

















short in a ﬁnancial security. Moreover, this equation sheds light on what happens
along the homotopy path when an agent changes sides on a security market, for
example, from being long, to being inactive, to being short. When the agent’s
long position in asset j is reduced down to zero, and the homotopy path is at the






j =0 . As the homotopy path moves through the interior of   P(r ) both
shadow prices are positive indicating by complementary slackness that the asset
variable is zero, that is θh




j =0 . As the path hits
a set   P(r  ) where the agent is short in asset j (in its interior) the shadow prices










j ≥ 0 resulting in the following
inequalities for all h ∈ H,
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An immediate consequence of the last inequalities is that the price difference
between the asset prices in a demand-perfect equilibrium and a supply-perfect












s} and in a supply-perfect equilibrium the lower












3.6 A differentiable homotopy
A drawback of our algorithm is that a large number of bid-ask structures might be
generated before reaching a demand-perfect equilibrium.To avoid this problem we









j ) of the nonnegativity constraints for the portfolio vari-
ables. See Garcia and Zangwill (1981) for a discussion of this approach. Equations














j by a single vari-
able. We introduce two vectors α−,α + ∈ RHJ and substitute the following func-


























and we can drop them from consideration.
A bid-ask structure r corresponds to (α−,α +) ∈ A−(r) × A+(r), where
A−(r)={α− ∈ RHJ | α
h,−
j ≤ 0 if (h,j) ∈ R−(r)
α
h,−
j ≥ 0 if (h,j) ∈ R0(r) ∪ R+(r)}
A+(r)={α+ ∈ RHJ | α
h,+
j ≤ 0 if (h,j) ∈ R+(r)
α
h,+
j ≥ 0 if (h,j) ∈ R−(r) ∪ R0(r)}.
Given a particular bid-ask structure, equations (1)–(3) are also automatically sat-
isﬁed. There is a solution (t,q,λ−,λ +,θ,c) ∈   P(r) if and only if there is









j })l =0 , (15)









j })l =0 , (16)
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j })l − (max{0,−α
h,−
j )l})dj
s =0 , (18)
















1+eqj =0 ,j ∈ J. (19)
The advantage of this reduced system is the absence of inequality constraints
and the independence of the system of the sign vector r. We can use standard
path-following methods to follow the path generated by this particular homotopy.
Obviously the values of all variables along the path generated by this homotopy
are identical to those along the path generated by the homotopy   F.
4 Numerical example
We implemented our homotopy algorithm on a 450 MHz PCPentiumII using the
softwarepackageHOMPACK.ThissoftwarepackageisacollectionofFORTRAN
77 subroutines for solving systems of nonlinear equations using homotopy meth-
ods (Watson et al., 1987). From the three methods available in HOMPACK we
selectedthemostrobustpath-followingalgorithm,whichtracksthehomotopypath
by solving an ordinary differential equation. The starting point of the homotopy
can be found using a standard nonlinear equation solver. We use a variation of
the penalty approach of Schmedders (1998). We approximate the Jacobian of the
homotopy function with a one-sided difference formula. When the path-following
routine ﬁnds a solution we use a Newton routine to reﬁne the solution to further
reduce the error. In all our examples the maximum relative errors are of the order
of magnitude of 10−10. The running time of the computer implementation of our
algorithm is less than two seconds for the examples below.
4.1 Simple economy
ConsideraneconomywithH =2agents,S =4possiblestatesinperiodt =1 ,and
J =2assets, called a bond and a stock. Both agents have identical von-Neumann-
Morgenstern CRRA utility functions with identical uniform beliefs. That is, agentComputing equilibria in ﬁnance economies with incomplete markets and transaction costs 509








































Figure 1.Asset trades of agent 1 along the homotopy path















The two agents have coefﬁcients of risk-aversion of γ1 =5and γ2 =1 , respec-
tively. Both agents have an endowment of e1
0 = e2
0 =1in period 0. Agent 1
has an endowment (labor income) e1
1 =( 0 .9,1.1,0.9,1.1) at date t =1 ;agent
2 has zero endowment at t =1 , but he owns the entire stock paying dividends
dst =( 0 .5,1.0,1.5,2.0). The stock is in unit net supply. (Agent 2’s endowment at
t =0can be thought of as the stock’s dividend dst
0 =1at t =0 .) The bond pays
one unit in the second period regardless of the state of nature and is in zero net
supply.Agents trading the bond and the stock have to pay identical transaction cost
k = kb = kst =0 .05 for both securities.
Using the differentiable homotopy of Section 3.6 we need to solve a system of
2HJ+H+HS+J =2 0equationswith21unknowns.Bysolvingequations(17)
and(18)fortheconsumptionvariablesandsubstitutingtheobtainedvaluesintothe
ﬁrst-order conditions (15) and (16) we can reduce the system to 2HJ + J =1 0
equationsand11unknowns.Weusetheexpectedpayoffsofthetwoassetsasvalues
for the “starting" prices q0, that is, q0
b =1and q0
st =1 .25.
We depict the nature of the homotopy path in a few ﬁgures. Figures 1 and 2
show the change of agent 1’s and agent 2’s portfolio, respectively, as a function of
the homotopy parameter. The behavior of the two portfolios is extremely different
along the path. For small values of t the ﬁrst agent is long in the bond and short in510 P.J.J. Herings and K. Schmedders










































trades of agent 2 along the homotopy path
Figure 2.Asset trades of agent 2 along the homotopy path






































asset prices along the homotopy path







differentiability. However, these kinks in the ﬁrst agent’s portfolio functions do not
affect the second agent’s portfolio functions.Along the homotopy path no holding
of the second agent hits zero for t<1 resulting in smooth portfolio functions.
Note that equation (19) does not enforce market clearing for t<1. Only as t hits
1 the variable θ2
b decreases to zero. In equilibrium the bond market is closed. The
equilibrium trade on the stock market equals a sale of 0.012 shares by agent 2 to
agent 1. Figure 3 displays the behavior of the asset prices along the homotopy path.
Both price functions are smooth and are unaffected by the kinks in the portfolio
functions of agent 1.
4.2 The need for an equilibrium selection
With this simple economy we can also show the importance of an equilibrium
selection. Figure 4 shows the prices along the homotopy path for the homotopy
without the term used for the equilibrium selection, that is, for the homotopy where









j−qj)=0 ,j ∈ J.
Until t hits 1 the price paths are identical. But in equilibrium the bond is not traded
due to the large transaction costs resulting in a continuum of equilibrium bond






































asset prices along the homotopy path
Figure 4. Continuum of equilibrium prices512 P.J.J. Herings and K. Schmedders
prices. If we don’t force the homotopy to make an equilibrium selection then the
path runs into this continuum and the homotopy exhibits a drop in rank at t =1
which causes numerical problems. (In this example the homotopy solver cannot
ﬁnd a unique stable solution at t =1and instead ﬁnds many solutions with varying
bond prices. Eventually the solver reports one of the found solutions and indicates
a numerical problem.)
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